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SOCIAL SECURITY SURVIVOR BENEFITS: 
WHY CONGRESS MUST CREATE A 
UNIFORM STANDARD OF ELIGIBILITY FOR 
POSTHUMOUSLY CONCEIVED CHILDREN 
Abstract: Legal issues surrounding posthumously conceived children of-
ten arise in the context of the Social Security Act, which looks to state law 
to determine who qualifies for benefits through a deceased parent. Be-
cause states have failed to respond promptly to the possibility of posthu-
mous conception, reliance on state law does not adequately protect the 
rights of this special class of children. This Note argues that Congress must 
create a uniform standard of Social Security eligibility for posthumously 
conceived children, and proposes that such children should receive bene-
fits only if (1) before death, the deceased father agreed in writing to be re-
sponsible for and support a child conceived with his frozen sperm, and (2) 
the child is conceived within four years of the father’s death. 
Introduction 
 Imagine a young couple, just married and eager to start a family.1 
Before they can attempt to conceive any children, however, the hus-
band is diagnosed with cancer, forcing them to put their plans on 
hold.2 Remaining optimistic, the couple freezes the husband’s sperm to 
preserve their ability to have children after he recovers.3 But, despite 
chemotherapy and radiation treatments, doctors finally inform the 
couple that the husband will soon die.4 Devastated, the couple tries to 
cope with the news that their dream of raising a family together will 
never come true.5 Ultimately, they decide that although the husband 
will be gone, the wife will use his frozen sperm to have a baby.6 The 
thought that his wife will still be able to bear his children greatly com-
forts the husband in his final days.7 After he dies, his wife becomes 
                                                                                                                      
1 See Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954, 956 (8th Cir. 2011) (presenting similar facts). 
2 See id. 
3 See id. 
4 See id. at 957. 
5 See id. 
6 See id. 
7 See Beeler, 651 F.3d at 957. 
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pregnant and gives birth to a child.8 Should this child—fatherless only 
because cancer tragically interrupted the couple’s plans—have fewer 
rights than a child whose father lived to conceive the baby naturally?9 
 The law has always addressed the rights of posthumous children 
conceived before and born after their fathers’ deaths.10 But recent ad-
vancements in reproductive technology have created a new type of 
posthumous child like the one described above: a child conceived after 
the death of one or both of the child’s genetic parents.11 Unfortu-
nately, the law does not protect posthumously conceived children as 
uniformly as traditional posthumous children.12 Legal issues surround-
ing posthumously conceived children often arise in the context of the 
Social Security Act (“the Act”), which looks to state law to determine 
who qualifies for benefits through a deceased parent.13 Because states 
have failed to respond promptly to the possibility of posthumous con-
ception, reliance on state law does not adequately provide uniform pro-
tection for this special class of children.14 Therefore, this Note argues 
that Congress must create a uniform standard of Social Security eligibil-
ity for posthumously conceived children that addresses their unique 
situation.15 
                                                                                                                     
 Part I of this Note details developments in reproductive technol-
ogy that have allowed for the possibility of posthumous conception, and 
explains the Act and its relationship with the Social Security Admini-
 
8 See id. 
9 Gloria J. Banks, Traditional Concepts and Nontraditional Conceptions: Social Security Sur-
vivor’s Benefits for Posthumously Conceived Children, 32 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 251, 302 (1999) (as-
serting that posthumously conceived children should not be punished because their par-
ents elected to conceive by assisted reproduction). 
10 Morgan Kirkland Wood, It Takes a Village: Considering the Other Interests at Stake When 
Extending Inheritance Rights to Posthumously Conceived Children, 44 Ga. L. Rev. 873, 896–97 
(2010). 
11 Laurence C. Nolan, Critiquing Society’s Response to the Needs of Posthumously Conceived 
Children, 82 Or. L. Rev. 1067, 1069–71 (2003) (describing recently developed methods of 
assisted reproduction). 
12 See Cynthia E. Fruchtman, Tales from the Crib: Posthumous Reproduction and ART, 33 
Whittier L. Rev. 311, 318 (2012) (noting that very few states have statutes addressing 
posthumously conceived children). 
13 See Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C. (Capato II ), 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2026 (2012) (holding 
that, pursuant to the Social Security Administration’s interpretation of the Act, posthu-
mously conceived children must qualify as intestate heirs under state law to receive bene-
fits under the Act). 
14 See infra notes 37–44 and accompanying text; see also Banks, supra note 9, at 330 (not-
ing that inconsistencies in state laws for posthumously conceived children have led to dif-
ferent treatment of similarly situated children based on the father’s state of domicile at 
death). 
15 See infra notes 209–354 and accompanying text. 
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stration (SSA).16 Part II discusses the first case to interpret the Act for a 
posthumously conceived child seeking Social Security survivor benefits, 
and then explains the SSA’s response to that ruling.17 Part III analyzes 
the circuit split created by the three circuit court cases that addressed 
the issue in 2011.18 Part III then details the 2012 case, Astrue v. Capato 
(Capato II ), in which the U.S. Supreme Court resolved the circuit split 
by holding that the SSA’s interpretation of the Act as requiring post-
humously conceived children to qualify as heirs under state intestacy 
law in order to receive child survivor benefits was reasonable and enti-
tled to deference.19 Finally, Part IV argues that posthumously conceived 
children should not have to rely on state intestacy statutes to qualify for 
benefits and discusses the reasons that Congress must update the Act at 
the federal level.20 Part IV then contends that an appropriate addition 
to the Act would explicitly allow posthumously conceived children to 
receive benefits if (1) they are conceived within four years of their fa-
thers’ deaths, and (2) before death, their fathers provided written con-
sent to have and to support the children conceived with their frozen 
sperm.21 
I. Posthumous Conception and the Social Security Act 
 Section A of this Part addresses assisted reproduction and discusses 
how states have responded to the possibility of posthumous concep-
tion.22 Section B explains the relevant provisions of the Act and why 
they become problematic when applied to posthumously conceived 
children.23 Section C explains the SSA’s role in interpreting the Act 
and discusses the level of deference courts must afford to the SSA’s in-
terpretation.24 
                                                                                                                      
16 See infra notes 22–99 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 100–135 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 136–181 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 182–208 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 209–307 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 308–354 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes 25–46 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 47–70 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 71–99 and accompanying text. 
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A. Posthumously Conceived Children 
 Assisted reproduction and cryopreservation are appealing options 
for couples facing cancer.25 Because chemotherapy can leave a man 
sterile, he may choose to freeze his sperm before undergoing treatment 
to preserve the couple’s ability to have children.26 If he later dies, his 
wife might use the sperm to conceive a child after his death.27 Ques-
tions concerning whether posthumously conceived children can inherit 
from their deceased fathers arise from this fact pattern when the child 
applies for Social Security survivor benefits.28 
 Modern medicine has developed various methods of assisted re-
production to make posthumous conception possible.29 One popular 
method is artificial insemination, in which the sperm is inserted into 
the woman to fertilize her egg as in natural conception.30 Another 
commonly used procedure is in vitro fertilization.31 There, fertilization 
of an extracted egg occurs outside the body, and the resulting zygote is 
subsequently implanted into the woman’s uterus.32 
 In anticipation of assisted reproduction, men can preserve sperm 
through cryopreservation, by which the sperm is frozen to suspend de-
velopment until it is needed.33 Sperm can be stored for many years 
through this process, allowing for conception long after the donor‘s 
death.34 Cryopreservation of eggs is also possible.35 Thus, through as-
sisted reproduction, a woman with donated sperm and a donated egg 
could conceive a child after both of its genetic parents are deceased.36 
                                                                                                                      
25 See Capato II, 132 S. Ct. at 2025 (using assisted reproduction and cryopreservation to 
preserve a cancer-stricken husband’s sperm); Beeler, 651 F.3d at 956 (same); Schafer v. As-
true, 641 F.3d 49, 51 (4th Cir. 2011) (same); Gillett-Netting v. Barnhardt, 371 F.3d 593, 594 
(9th Cir. 2004) (same). 
26 Nolan, supra note 11, at 1072. 
27 Id. 
28 See Capato II, 132 S. Ct. at 2025; Beeler, 651 F.3d at 957; Schafer, 641 F.3d at 51; Gillett-
Netting, 371 F.3d at 595. 
29 Nolan, supra note 11, at 1069–70. 
30 Id. at 1069. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 1070. Additionally, reproduction can occur through a gamete intrafallopian 
transfer, in which the sperm and egg are injected into the woman’s fallopian tubes where 
fertilization occurs. Id. at 1070–71. In a similar procedure called zygote intrafallopian 
transfer, fertilization occurs outside the body, as with in vitro fertilization, and the zygote is 
subsequently injected into the fallopian tubes. Id. at 1071. 
33 Id. at 1071. 
34 Id. 
35 Nolan, supra note 11, at 1071. 
36 See id. 
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 Because these technological advancements are so recent, the status 
of posthumously conceived children with respect to their deceased par-
ents has received little attention from state legislatures or judiciaries.37 
Only thirteen states have statutes dealing explicitly with posthumously 
conceived children.38 Nine of these states have adopted a version of the 
Uniform Parentage Act (“UPA”), a model act that addresses the estab-
lishment of parent-child relationships.39 The UPA acknowledges a par-
ent-child relationship if the father provided written consent to be the 
parent of a child conceived by a woman with his sperm after his 
death.40 The four other states address posthumously conceived chil-
dren in their intestacy statutes, specifically allowing such children to 
inherit from their deceased parent if they meet certain criteria.41 In the 
remaining states, no laws expressly discuss posthumously conceived 
children.42 Because these states’ intestacy statutes were drafted before 
posthumous conception was possible, most statutes are ambiguous as 
applied to posthumously conceived children.43 Only a very small num-
                                                                                                                      
 
37 See infra notes 38–43 and accompanying text. 
38 See infra notes 39–42 and accompanying text. 
39 See Ala. Code § 26-17-707 (2009); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-4-106(8) (2012); Del. 
Code Ann. tit. 13, § 8-707 (2009); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-11A-707 (Supp. 2011); N.D. Cent. 
Code § 14-20-65 (2009); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 160.707 (West 2008); Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78B-15-707 (LexisNexis 2012); Wash. Rev. Code §§ 26.26.730 (West 2005 & Supp. 
2012); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-907 (2011). 
40 Unif. Parentage Act § 707 (2002). Section 707 of the UPA states: 
If an individual who consented in a record to be a parent by assisted repro-
duction dies before placement of eggs, sperm, or embryos, the deceased indi-
vidual is not a parent of the resulting child unless the deceased spouse con-
sented in a record that if assisted reproduction were to occur after death, the 
deceased individual would be a parent of the child. 
Id. 
41 See Cal. Prob. Code § 249.5 (West Supp. 2013) (allowing posthumously conceived 
children to inherit if they are conceived within two years and if the decedent consented in 
writing, signed and dated, to the inheritance); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 742.17(4) (West 2010) 
(allowing posthumously conceived children to inherit if provided for in the decedent’s 
will); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:391.1 (2008) (allowing posthumously conceived children 
born within three years to inherit if consented to in writing by the decedent); Va. Code 
Ann. § 20-158(B) (2008) (allowing posthumously conceived children to inherit if the de-
cedent consented in writing). Intestacy laws are default rules governing the disposition of 
the property of a person who dies without a will. Reid Kress Weisbord, Wills for Everyone: 
Helping Individuals Opt Out of Intestacy, 53 B.C. L. Rev. 877, 878 (2012). 
42 See David Shayne & Christine Quigley, Defining ‘Descendants’: Science Outpaces Tradi-
tional Heirship, 38 Est. Plan. 14, 17 (2011) (noting that only about one-third of states have 
statutes or case law dealing with posthumously conceived children). 
43 See, e.g., Finley v. Astrue, 270 S.W.3d 849, 853–55 (Ark. 2008) (analyzing whether 
freezing an embryo during the father’s life made the resulting child, implanted into the 
mother after the father’s death, fit into Arkansas’ intestacy statute covering posthumous 
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ber of cases have attempted to interpret intestacy laws for posthumously 
conceived children, and they reach varied results.44 
 Moreover, posthumously conceived children are in a unique posi-
tion that was not anticipated by the drafters of the Act.45 Thus, when 
these children began to apply for survivor benefits under the Act, un-
foreseen tensions arose in its interpretation.46 
B. The Social Security Act 
 In 1935, Congress passed the Act to promote economic stability 
following the Great Depression by providing continued income to 
workers after retirement.47 Congress amended the Act in 1939 and cre-
ated survivor benefits for children whose working parents had died.48 
The underlying goal of these child survivor benefits was to replace the 
lost financial support of the deceased wage earner.49 By keeping fami-
lies together and giving children the opportunity to grow up securely, 
Congress intended to increase the chances that these children would 
become productive adults, rather than wards of the state, despite the 
untimely death of a parent.50 In 1965, Congress amended the Act to 
                                                                                                                      
children who were “conceived before” the intestate’s death); Woodward v. Comm’r of Soc. 
Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 262–63 (Mass. 2002) (analyzing whether posthumously conceived 
children fit into the ambiguous term “issue” in Massachusetts’ intestacy statute); Khabbaz 
ex rel. Eng v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 930 A.2d 1180, 1183–84 (N.H. 2007) (analyzing 
whether a posthumously conceived child is a “surviving issue”). 
44 See, e.g., Finley, 270 S.W.3d at 850 (holding that posthumously conceived children 
cannot inherit under Arkansas intestacy law); Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 259 (holding that 
posthumously conceived children can inherit under Massachusetts intestacy law in limited 
circumstances); Khabbaz, 930 A.2d at 1182 (holding that posthumously conceived children 
cannot inherit under New Hampshire intestacy law); In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 
1264 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000) (holding that certain posthumously conceived chil-
dren can inherit under New Jersey intestacy law). 
45 See Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. (Capato I ), 631 F.3d 626, 627 (3d Cir. 
2011) (“It goes without saying that these technologies were not within the imagination, 
much less the contemplation, of Congress when the relevant sections of the Act came to be 
. . . .”), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012). 
46 See Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 595–96. 
47 Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 627, §§ 402–406, 49 Stat. 622, 627–29 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601–619 (2006)); Ann-Patton Nelson, Note, A New Era of Dead-
Beat Dads: Determining Social Security Survivor Benefits for Children Who Are Posthumously Con-
ceived, 56 Mercer L. Rev. 759, 763 (2005) (explaining the history of the Social Security 
Act). 
48 Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, tit. 2, Pub. L. No. 76-379, 53 Stat. 
1360, 1364–65 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 402, 416(e)); Nelson, supra note 47, at 
763. 
49 Kristine S. Knaplund, Equal Protection, Postmortem Conception, and Intestacy, 53 U. Kan. 
L. Rev. 627, 631 (2005). 
50 Banks, supra note 9, at 358. 
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expand the class of children eligible for survivor benefits to include 
many extramarital children who were previously ineligible.51 
 The old-age and survivor benefits provision, 42 U.S.C. § 402, de-
tails the Act’s overall scheme.52 Section 402(d) states that “every child 
(as defined in 416(e) of this title)” is entitled to Social Security survivor 
benefits provided that the child meets certain enumerated criteria.53 
Unfortunately, §§ 416(e) and 416(h) define the term “child” differ-
ently, and from the Act’s text it is unclear how Congress intended these 
sections to interact.54 Though this lack of clarity is harmless in most 
cases, it becomes problematic when a posthumously conceived child 
applies for benefits.55 Unlike other children, posthumously conceived 
children often fit one definition but not the other.56 
 Section 416(e) defines “child” as “the child or legally adopted child 
of an individual.”57 Because paternity tends not to be disputed, posthu-
mously conceived children generally fit into this broad definition.58 
 Alternatively, § 416(h) uses narrower categories to define who may 
qualify as a child.59 Subsection 2(A) indicates that the Act shall apply 
state intestacy laws to determine whether an applicant is a “child” of the 
deceased parent.60 If the applicant would be able to inherit property 
from the deceased parent in the state of the parent’s domicile at death, 
then the applicant qualifies as a child for purposes of the subchapter.61 
Subsections 416(h)(2)(B) through 416(h)(3)(B), which were added in 
1965, provide other ways in which the applicant may be considered a 
child despite an inability to inherit from the deceased parent under 
                                                                                                                      
51 Social Security Act Amendments of 1965, ch. 666, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286, 
409–10 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)); see Knaplund, supra note 49, at 632. 
52 42 U.S.C. § 402. 
53 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (2006). The child must be unmarried, below specific age limits 
or under disability beginning before age twenty-two, and dependent on the insured at the 
time of the insured’s death. Id. 
54 Capato II, 132 S. Ct. at 2029 (discussing opposing interpretations of how the two sec-
tions interact). 
55 See Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 595–96 (“[T]he Social Security Act . . . [does not make] 
clear the rights of children conceived posthumously.”). 
56 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(e), 416(h); Capato I, 631 F.3d at 630 (holding that a posthu-
mously conceived child clearly satisfied § 416(e), but not § 416(h)). 
57 42 U.S.C. § 416(e)(1). This broad definition also includes the stepchildren, grand-
children, and step-grandchildren who meet certain conditions listed in subsections (e)(2) 
and (e)(3). Id. § 416(e)(2)–(3). 
58 See Capato I, 631 F.3d at 627 (holding that the biological offspring of a decedent and 
his widow clearly fit § 416(e)’s definition); Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 596 (same). 
59 42 U.S.C. § 416(h) (2006). 
60 Id. § 416(h)(2)(A). 
61 Id. 
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state intestacy law.62 For posthumously conceived children, however, 
none of the additional criteria in subsection (h) apply.63 Thus, whether 
these applicants are “children” under § 416(h) turns on whether post-
humously conceived children may inherit under the state’s intestacy 
law.64 As a result of states’ inadequate responses to posthumous con-
ception, it is extremely difficult for most posthumously conceived chil-
dren to argue, for Social Security purposes, that they are entitled to in-
herit.65 Therefore, the typical posthumously conceived child will not 
successfully meet the definition of “child” in § 416(h).66 
                                                                                                                     
 Because posthumously conceived children fit into the definition of 
“child” in § 416(e), and not in § 416(h), the relationship between the 
two sections is central to analyzing whether an applicant is a “child” or 
not.67 Until the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in Capato II, which 
held that courts must defer to the SSA’s interpretation of the issue,68 
circuit courts struggled to resolve the ambiguity regarding how these 
provisions interact.69 Is it sufficient that the applicant is the “child” of 
the wage earner, satisfying subsection (e), or does the failure to inherit 
under state law under subsection (h) bar the applicant from receiving 
benefits?70 
 
62 See id. § 416(h)(2)(B)–(3)(B). According to these subsections, an applicant is a 
child if: (1) the applicant’s parents participated in a marriage ceremony that would have 
been valid but for a legal impediment; (2) the insured acknowledged parentage in writing; 
(3) a court decreed the insured to be the applicant’s parent before the insured’s death; 
(4) a court ordered the insured to support the child because the insured is the applicant’s 
parent; or (5) the Commissioner of Social Security finds satisfactory evidence of parent-
age, and the deceased parent had lived with or supported the applicant while alive. Id. 
63 Schafer, 641 F.3d at 53. Marriage ends at death, eliminating the first possibility, and 
the other four require the deceased to have performed some action after the child’s birth. 
See id. 
64 See, e.g., Beeler, 651 F.3d at 965 (holding that a child did not satisfy § 416(h) because 
she could not inherit under Iowa intestacy law). 
65 See supra notes 37–44 and accompanying text (discussing state law responses to the 
possibility of posthumous conception). 
66 See Beeler, 651 F.3d at 965. 
67 See Schafer, 641 F.3d at 52 (“This case turns on the relationship between the brief def-
inition of ‘child’ in § 416(e)(1) . . . and § 416(h)’s more specific provisions.”). 
68 Capato II, 132 S. Ct. at 2026. 
69 Compare Schafer, 641 F.3d at 51 (holding that an applicant must fit into a § 416(h) 
category to receive benefits), with Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 597 (holding that an applicant 
must only satisfy § 416(e) to receive benefits). 
70 See Schafer, 641 F.3d at 52; Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 597. 
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C. The Social Security Administration and Chevron Deference 
 Congress created the SSA, headed by the Commissioner of Social 
Security (“the Commissioner”), to administer and interpret the Act.71 
Among its various duties, the SSA is responsible for handling all claims 
for survivor benefits.72 In addition to reviewing applications for these 
benefits, the SSA has implemented a procedure for applicants who wish 
to challenge an initial denial of benefits.73 The four-step appeals pro-
cedure begins with an opportunity to have another SSA agent recon-
sider the application.74 Then, an applicant may request a hearing be-
fore an administrative law judge (“ALJ”).75 If the ALJ denies benefits, 
the applicant may appeal to the Social Security Appeals Council.76 
Upon exhausting these options, the applicant may bring suit in federal 
district court.77 
                                                                                                                     
 To aid in its determinations of eligibility for benefits, the SSA has 
promulgated regulations that interpret the Act’s provisions—including 
§§ 416(e) and 416(h)—according to an official rulemaking process.78 
Therefore, a major issue in cases attempting to interpret the interplay 
between § 416(e) and § 416(h) is whether the SSA’s interpretation, as 
expressed in its regulations, is entitled to deference under the  Supreme 
Court’s 1984 decision, Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc.79 
 In Chevron, the Supreme Court created a two-step inquiry for 
courts to determine when they must defer to an agency’s official inter-
pretation of a statute.80 If the inquiry leads the court to find an 
 
 
71 42 U.S.C. §§ 901–902 (2006). 
72 SSA, Pub. No. 31-251, Summary of Performance and Financial Information: 
Fiscal Year 2011, at 1 (2012), available at http://www.ssa.gov/finance/2011/FY_2011_ 
Summary_PAR[1].pdf. 
73 SSA, Pub. No. 70-10281, Your Right to an Administrative Law Judge Hearing 
and Appeals Council Review of Your Social Security Case 2–3 (2009), available at 
http://www.ssa.gov/appeals/odar_pubs/70–10281.pdf. 
74 Id. at 2. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 3. 
77 Id. 
78 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.350, .354 to .355 (2012). 
79 See 467 U.S. 838, 842–44 (1984). 
80 Id. at 842–43. In Chevron, Congress had endowed the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) with the power to promulgate regulations implementing the Clean Air Act. 
Id. at 846. Pursuant to that power, the EPA issued a regulation in which it specifically de-
fined a key term for the purposes of the Clean Air Act’s amendments. Id. at 840–41. In 
response to a challenge to the EPA regulation, the Supreme Court upheld the agency’s 
definition. Id. at 842. Because Congress had not commanded a specific definition to be 
830 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 54:821 
agency’s interpretation is entitled to Chevron deference, then the court 
will uphold the interpretation and will not substitute its own judgment 
for that of the agency.81 In posthumously conceived children cases 
prior to Capato II, circuit courts struggled with both Chevron steps when 
deciding whether to defer to the SSA’s interpretation of the Act.82 
                                                                                                                     
 Step one of the Chevron deference test asks whether Congress has 
spoken directly to the issue in question.83 If it has, the analysis is com-
plete;84 Congress’s unambiguously expressed intent must control, and 
an agency has no power to contradict that intent.85 At step one in post-
humously conceived children cases, circuit courts differed on whether 
Congress specifically addressed the issue of how § 416(e) and § 416(h) 
relate.86 Additionally, the circuit courts that have held that Congress 
has spoken to the issue disagreed further as to what Congress said— 
whether Congress clearly intended satisfaction of § 416(e) to be suffi-
cient or whether Congress clearly intended that applicants must satisfy 
§ 416(h).87 
 Step two of the Chevron test asks whether the agency’s interpreta-
tion of the issue on which Congress has been silent or ambiguous is 
based on a permissible construction of the statute.88 Because agencies 
are experts on issues that can be highly complex or technical and about 
which courts have little expertise, a court may not substitute its own 
judgment for any reasonable interpretation by the agency.89 For an 
agency’s construction of the statute to be reasonable, it must be consis-
 
used throughout the Clean Air Act and the EPA’s interpretation was based on a permissi-
ble construction of the statute, the agency’s judgment was entitled to deference. Id. at 845. 
81 Id. at 843. 
82 See Beeler, 651 F.3d at 962 (resolving the issue at step two); Schafer, 641 F.3d at 60 (re-
solving the issue at step one); Capato I, 631 F.3d at 631 n.5 (resolving the issue at step one); 
Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 597 (implicitly resolving the issue at step one). 
83 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. 
84 Id. at 842–43. 
85 Id. Some ambiguities may only become apparent in the context of the overall statutory 
scheme or when the court attempts to read the statute as a coherent, harmonious whole. See 
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132–33 (2000). Therefore, to de-
termine whether Congress has specifically addressed a certain question, the court should 
look at the statutory context, not just a single provision in isolation. Id. 
86 See, e.g., Beeler, 651 F.3d at 962 (assuming that Congress’s intent was ambiguous); 
Schafer, 641 F.3d at 60 (concluding that Congress’s intent was unambiguously expressed); 
Capato I, 631 F.3d at 631 n.5 (same); Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 597 (same). 
87 See Schafer, 641 F.3d at 60 (holding that Congress intended all applicants to satisfy 
§ 416(h)); Capato I, 631 F.3d at 631 (holding that Congress intended satisfaction of 
§ 416(e) to be sufficient); Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 597 (holding that Congress intended 
satisfaction of § 416(e) to be sufficient). 
88 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
89 See id. 
2013] Social Security Survivor Benefits for Posthumously Conceived Children 831 
tent with the statute’s plain language and meaning, and must not be 
contrary to Congress’s intent or purpose.90 Additionally, the statute’s 
legislative history can provide the court with guidance as to whether an 
agency’s interpretation is reasonable.91 Assuming there is ambiguity in 
§ 416(e) and § 416(h), circuit courts prior to Capato II struggled to de-
termine whether the SSA’s interpretations of the word “child” in its 
regulations were reasonable given the statute’s plain language, underly-
ing purpose, and legislative history.92 
 The SSA’s regulations echo the statute’s basic provisions and elab-
orate on its terms.93 In 20 C.F.R. § 404.350, the SSA describes who is 
entitled to child survivor benefits.94 According to that regulation, an 
applicant is entitled to benefits if the applicant is the child of a de-
ceased person as described in the subsequent regulations.95 The sub-
section entitled “Your relationship to the insured” further explains that 
the term “child” includes the insured’s “natural child.”96 The next sub-
section answers the question “Who is the insured’s natural child?” by 
listing the same conditions found in § 416(h) of the Act.97 The text of 
this subsection does not explicitly clarify whether the child must fulfill 
one of these conditions or whether these conditions simply present ad-
ditional ways to be considered a natural child where the applicant’s sta-
tus is in dispute.98 The SSA, however, has consistently maintained that 
its regulations require the applicant to satisfy one of the conditions 
whether or not parentage is in dispute.99 
                                                                                                                      
90 Id. at 843 n.9; see Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Bos. & Me. Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 417 
(1992). 
91 See Nationsbank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 258 
(1995) (concluding that the insertion of certain language to the statute long after the 
National Bank Act was initially passed made the Comptroller’s interpretation reasonable). 
Legislative history may indicate that an agency’s construction of a statute is contrary to the 
will of Congress. See id. It is also particularly helpful when Congress has made changes to 
the statute over time. See id. The addition or deletion of language often reveals Congress’s 
intent in relation to a certain term or provision. See id. 
92 See Beeler, 651 F.3d at 956 (holding that SSA regulations are reasonable); Schafer, 641 
F.3d at 61 (stating, in dicta, that SSA regulations are reasonable). 
93 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.350, .354 to .355 (2012). 
94 Id. § 404.350. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. § 404.354. The insured’s legally adopted child, grandchild, and stepchild also 
qualify. Id. 
97 Id. § 404.355. 
98 See id. 
99 Capato II, 132 S. Ct. at 2033 (noting that the SSA’s interpretation has been “adhered 
to without deviation for many decades”); SSAR 05-1(9), 70 Fed. Reg. 55,656, 55,657 (Sept. 
22, 2005). 
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II. The Gillett-Netting Decision and Its Aftermath 
 Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2012 decision, Astrue v. Capato 
(Capato II ), which held that the SSA’s interpretation of the Act’s provi-
sions was reasonable, only four federal appellate cases had addressed 
the interplay of § 416(e) and § 416(h).100 The first of these cases, Gillett-
Netting v. Barnhardt, arose in 2004 in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit.101 Section A of this Part details the groundbreaking case 
that first addressed the issue of posthumously conceived children and 
the two definitions of “child” in the Act.102 Section B explains the SSA’s 
official response to that decision.103 
A. The Ninth Circuit’s Interpretation: Gillett-Netting v. Barnhardt 
 When it decided Gillett-Netting in 2004, the Ninth Circuit became 
the first federal circuit to interpret § 416 in a posthumously conceived 
child case.104 The Ninth Circuit held that satisfying § 416(e) is suffi-
cient for an applicant to qualify as a “child” under the Act, and implied 
that the identical structure of the regulations and provisions in the Act 
made a Chevron deference inquiry unnecessary.105 
 In 1994, Arizona residents Robert Netting and Rhonda Gillett-
Netting were struggling to conceive a child when Netting was diag-
nosed with cancer.106 When advised that chemotherapy could leave him 
sterile, Netting deposited semen in a sperm bank where it was frozen 
and stored for his wife’s use.107 Netting indicated that he wanted his 
wife to bear his children with the frozen semen even if he did not sur-
vive his fight with cancer.108 He died two months later, and within a 
year, Gillett-Netting became pregnant through in vitro fertilization.109 
As a result, she gave birth to twins Juliet and Piers.110 
 Gillett-Netting applied for Social Security survivor benefits on 
behalf of the twins, but the SSA denied her claim.111 She subsequently 
                                                                                                                      
100 See Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C. (Capato II ), 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2027 (2012). 
101 371 F.3d 593, 596 n.3 (9th Cir. 2004). 
102 See infra notes 104–127 and accompanying text. 
103 See infra notes 128–135 and accompanying text. 
104 371 F.3d at 596 n.3. 
105 See id. at 596 & 597 n.4. 
106 Id. at 594. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 595. 
109 Id. at 594–95. 
110 Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 595. 
111 Id. 
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requested a hearing before an ALJ, who determined that the twins were 
not entitled to benefits because they were conceived after the deceased 
wage earner was already dead and thus were never dependent on 
him.112 
 When the Social Security Appeals Council refused to review the 
decision, Gillett-Netting filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Dis-
trict of Arizona, claiming that the denial of benefits was not supported 
by substantial evidence and not in accordance with the law.113 The dis-
trict court determined that Arizona’s intestacy laws did not permit the 
twins to inherit from their father and that therefore they did not fit into 
any category of “children” in § 416(h).114 It thus held that the twins 
were not Netting’s “children” under the Act.115 
 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the twins were 
Netting’s children for purposes of the Act.116 The court reasoned that 
Congress added § 416(h) to the Act to offer alternative ways for chil-
dren whose parents were unmarried or whose parentage was in dispute 
to receive benefits.117 It found nothing in the Act suggesting that an 
applicant must use § 416(h) to establish parentage when it is not in 
dispute.118 Therefore, where parentage is unquestioned, the court held 
that the applicant is a “natural child” under § 416(e) and that § 416(h) 
is irrelevant.119 
 The Ninth Circuit did not engage in an explicit Chevron inquiry to 
determine whether the interpretation in the SSA regulations was enti-
tled to deference.120 Rather, it determined that the regulations failed to 
suggest that the applicant must consult § 416(h)’s analogue in the reg-
ulations— “Who is the insured’s natural child?” —when parentage is 
not in dispute.121 The court implied that the term “natural child” in 
§ 404.354 of the regulations, just as in § 416(e), necessarily includes all 
biological children.122 Because biological children fit the commonly 
                                                                                                                      
112 Id. 
113 Id.; Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 231 F. Supp. 2d 961, 964 (D. Ariz. 2002) rev’d and 
remanded, 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004). 
114 Gillett-Netting, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 966. 
115 Id. Gillett-Netting also contended that denying the twins benefits violated equal 
protection, but the district court dismissed that claim. Id. at 963. The Supreme Court 
quickly dismissed the same equal protection claim in Capato II. 132 S. Ct. at 2033. 
116 Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 594. 
117 Id. at 596. 
118 Id. at 597. 
119 See id. 
120 See id. at 597 n.4. 
121 Id. 
122 See Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 597 n.4. 
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accepted definition of the term, they need not establish further that 
they are “natural children” under § 404.355’s more specific definition 
unless their parents were never married.123 Therefore, the court implic-
itly concluded that no deference inquiry was necessary because the 
same construction applied to both the Act and the regulations.124 
 The SSA claimed that, despite the absence of an explicit directive, 
the regulations did require the applicant to pass through the more spe-
cific definition of “child.”125 The Ninth Circuit held, however, that the 
SSA’s stance on how to read the regulations was prompted by the litiga-
tion and not promulgated formally in a regulation.126 Thus, this aspect 
of the SSA’s interpretation was irrelevant to the court in Gillett-Netting.127 
B. The SSA’s Response to Gillett-Netting 
 Following the Gillett-Netting decision, the SSA issued an acquies-
cence ruling indicating that it would follow the Ninth Circuit’s inter-
pretation only in states within the circuit.128 The SSA would consider 
any posthumously conceived child within the circuit a “child” if parent-
age was not in dispute regardless of state intestacy laws.129 The SSA, 
however, still maintained that its position on the relationship between 
§ 416(e) and § 416(h) was correct.130 Therefore, it would continue to 
advocate that interpretation in all other jurisdictions.131 
 By releasing this ruling, the SSA precluded future courts from 
concluding, as the Ninth Circuit did, that the interpretation of the reg-
ulations it advocated for in Gillett-Netting was prompted by litigation.132 
As Gillett-Netting highlighted, the SSA’s position that applicants must 
                                                                                                                      
123 See id. 
124 See id. 
125 See id. 
126 See id. 
127 See id.; see also Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 213 (1988) (holding 
that deference to an “agency’s convenient litigating position” is inappropriate). 
128 SSAR 05-1(9), 70 Fed. Reg. 55,656, 55,657 (Sept. 22, 2005). The SSA issues an ac-
quiescence ruling whenever a decision of a U.S. Court of Appeals conflicts with the SSA’s 
interpretation of the Act. Id. at 55,656. These rulings state why the SSA’s interpretation 
differs from the court’s and how the SSA plans to apply the holding of the case going for-
ward. Id. 
129 Id. at 55,657. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 Compare Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 597 n.4. (noting that the SSA’s interpretation of 
the regulations was prompted by litigation and thus was irrelevant), with Beeler v. Astrue, 
651 F.3d 954, 960 (8th Cir. 2011) (noting that the SSA’s reading of the regulations was 
found in the acquiescence ruling and was relevant to the deference inquiry). 
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consult the more specific section of the regulations in all cases was not 
clear from the regulations alone.133 The acquiescence ruling, however, 
codified the SSA’s reading of the regulations, and thus its interpreta-
tion could be eligible for deference in future cases.134 Therefore, the 
SSA’s official interpretation for the purposes of a deference inquiry in 
all cases following this ruling was that a posthumously conceived appli-
cant must fit into one of the enumerated categories under § 416(h) of 
the Act or § 404.355 of the regulations.135 
III. A Circuit Split Emerges and the Supreme Court Responds 
A. The 2011 Posthumously Conceived Children Cases 
 For nearly seven years following Gillett-Netting v. Barnhardt, no fed-
eral court of appeals discussed the interplay of § 416(e) and § 416(h), 
and in 2011, three different circuits faced posthumously conceived 
plaintiffs seeking Social Security survivor benefits.136 All three cases in-
volved the same basic facts: a husband froze sperm in anticipation of 
chemotherapy treatments and his wife used the sperm to conceive a 
child after his death.137 The only issue in each case was whether the ap-
plicants qualified as “children” without being able to inherit under state 
law.138 
1. Agreement with the Ninth Circuit 
 In January 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
endorsed Gillett-Netting’s interpretation of the Act and denied defer-
ence to the SSA’s interpretation in Capato ex rel B.N.C. v. Commissioner of 
Social Security (Capato I ).139 Like the court in Gillett-Netting, the Capato I 
                                                                                                                      
 
133 See Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 597 n.4. 
134 SSAR 05-1(9), 70 Fed. Reg. 55,656, 55,656 (Sept. 22, 2005); see, e.g., Beeler, 651 F.3d 
at 960 (noting that the Commissioner’s asserted position in the case is restated in the ac-
quiescence ruling). 
135 See Capato II, 132 S. Ct. at 2028–29 (stating that the SSA’s position was that satisfac-
tion of 20 C.F.R. § 404.355 is necessary); Beeler, 651 F.3d at 960 (same); Schafer v. Astrue, 
641 F.3d 49, 52–53 (4th Cir. 2011); 70 Fed. Reg. at 55,657 (same). 
136 See Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954, 956 (8th Cir. 2011); Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 
49, 51 (4th Cir. 2011); Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. (Capato I ), 631 F.3d 
626, 627 (3d Cir. 2011), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. 
Ct. 2021 (2012). 
137 Beeler, 651 F.3d at 956–57; Schafer, 641 F.3d at 51; Capato I, 631 F.3d at 627–28. 
138 Beeler, 651 F.3d at 959; Schafer, 641 F.3d at 53; Capato I, 631 F.3d at 628. 
139 631 F.3d at 630–31; see Gillett-Netting v. Barnhardt, 371 F.3d 593, 597 (9th Cir. 
2004). Robert Capato died from esophageal cancer in March 2002. Capato I, 631 F.3d at 
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court held that it was not compelled to consult § 416(h) when the Act’s 
general provision, § 402, explicitly refers to § 416(e) alone.140 Basic 
principles of statutory interpretation dictate that absent contrary indi-
cations, words in a statute are assumed to carry their ordinary, plain 
meaning.141 According to the court, the common meaning of the word 
“child” under § 416(e) undeniably encompasses undisputed biological 
offspring.142 Therefore, the court emphatically concluded that the 
children of a deceased wage earner and his widow are “children” under 
the Act.143 
 The Third Circuit held that the SSA’s interpretation of the Act was 
not entitled to deference because it was contrary to Congress’s unam-
biguously expressed intent.144 The court did not explicitly frame the 
issue as a Chevron question, but implicitly conducted a Chevron analysis 
and dealt with the SSA’s interpretation at step one.145 The court had to 
acknowledge that the acquiescence ruling reflected the SSA’s interpre-
tation, but it also stated that the Act did not compel or even suggest 
that this interpretation was valid.146 In a footnote, the court clarified 
that it had discerned Congress’s unambiguously expressed intent in the 
text of the statute and thus did not need to determine whether the 
SSA’s interpretation was reasonable.147 
 At the end of its opinion, the Third Circuit carefully limited its 
holding to the factual situation before it.148 The Commissioner had ar-
gued that it was problematic to assume that the term “child” automati-
                                                                                                                      
627. His wife conceived twins with his frozen sperm in January 2003 through in vitro fer-
tilization, and subsequently applied for benefits on their behalf. Id. at 628. When the SSA 
denied her claim, she requested a hearing before an ALJ. Id. In his decision, the ALJ la-
mented that although allowing benefits to the twins would be consistent with the purposes 
of the Act, he felt constrained by a law that lagged behind rapidly advancing medical tech-
nology. Id. Because the twins could not inherit under Florida intestacy law, the ALJ held 
that they were not Mr. Capato’s “children” under the Act. Id. Ms. Capato sued the Com-
missioner of Social Security in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, which 
affirmed the ALJ’s ruling. Id. 
140 Capato I, 631 F.3d at 631 (“[W]hy should we, much less why must we, refer to 
§ 416(h) when § 416(e) is so clear, and when we have before us the undisputed biological 
children of a deceased wage earner and his widow.”). 
141 See id. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 632 (“[A]re the undisputed biological children of a deceased wage earner and 
his widow ‘children’ within the meaning of the Act? The answer is a resounding ‘Yes.’”). 
144 Id. at 631 & n.5. 
145 See id. at 631 (using statutory interpretation to determine Congress’s intent); see also 
supra notes 80–92 and accompanying text (describing the two-step Chevron deference test). 
146 Capato I, 631 F.3d at 631. 
147 Id. at 631 n.5. 
148 Id. at 632. 
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cally includes every biological offspring.149 The court conceded that this 
argument could be persuasive in many other situations, given the ability 
to determine paternity scientifically in combination with the variety of 
modern family structures that arise through surrogacy and donated 
gametes.150 The opinion warned that advancements in reproductive 
technology have outpaced developments in the law and that posthu-
mous conception was an entirely new world, giving rise to a host of 
complex legal and moral questions that Congress had not envisioned 
when it passed the Act.151 
2. Disagreement with the Ninth Circuit 
 Later in 2011, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and 
Eighth Circuits created a circuit split by holding, contrary to the Capato 
I court, that applicants were required to satisfy § 416(h).152 Although 
the circuits came to the same conclusion as one another, each court 
resolved the issue at a different Chevron step.153 
 In April 2011, in Schafer v. Astrue, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit held that Congress unambiguously intended applicants 
to satisfy § 416(h) to receive benefits; thus, Chevron step one resolved the 
question.154 The court examined the Act as a whole and highlighted 
how the other circuits’ opinions were inconsistent with the structure of 
                                                                                                                      
149 Id. 
150 Id. Although traditionally exactly two people could participate in the creation of a 
child, now up to five distinct people can take part in the process of “having” a child: a 
sperm donor and an egg donor can provide the genetic material, a surrogate can give 
birth to the child, and two genetically unrelated people can orchestrate the conception 
and birth with the intention of raising the resulting child. John Lawrence Hill, What Does It 
Mean to Be a “Parent”? The Claims of Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
353, 355 (1991). Consequently, a child with a certain biological makeup could be the re-
sult of any of sixteen different combinations (in addition to traditional conception and 
birth) of those possible participants. Id. Therefore, biological paternity will not accurately 
indicate who the functional “parent” of the child is in many cases. Id. 
151 Capato I, 631 F.3d at 627, 632. 
152 See Beeler, 651 F.3d at 956; Schafer, 641 F.3d at 60; see also Capato I, 631 F.3d at 631 
(holding that applicants must satisfy § 416(e)). 
153 Beeler, 651 F.3d at 956 (holding that the issue is resolved at Chevron step two); Schaf-
er, 641 F.3d at 60 (holding that the issue is resolved at Chevron step one). 
154 Schafer, 641 F.3d at 60. The deceased in this case, Don Schafer, died in March 1993 
as a resident of Virginia. Id. at 51. In 1999, his wife conceived a child through in vitro fer-
tilization using his frozen sperm, and gave birth nearly seven years after his death. Id. Mrs. 
Schafer applied for benefits on behalf of the child, and the SSA denied her claim. Id. An 
ALJ subsequently awarded the child benefits, but the SSA Appeals Council reversed, hold-
ing that he was not a child under the Act because he could not inherit from his father 
under Virginia law. Id. Mrs. Schafer sought review in the U.S. District Court for the West-
ern District of North Carolina, which affirmed the decision of the Appeals Council. Id. 
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the Act.155 First, it stated that the term “child” cannot automatically en-
compass the deceased’s “natural children” simply because they are his 
biological offspring.156 It pointed to the Third Circuit’s acknowledge-
ment of the various family structures that arise from reproductive tech-
nology, surrogacy, and donors.157 Biological paternity in many cases 
does not indicate that the child has a relationship with or expectation of 
support from that parent.158 The court also reasoned that if Congress 
intended a biological relationship to be sufficient, it would not have in-
cluded any of the requirements in addition to biological parentage in 
§ 416(h)(2)(B) and § 416(h)(3)(C)(ii).159 The court refused to believe 
that Congress would leave such a critical term as “child” for the SSA to 
interpret without further direction.160 
 The Fourth Circuit additionally criticized the other circuits for as-
serting that § 416(e) only applies to children of married parents.161 This 
assertion cannot be true if the word “child” in § 416(e) includes all 
natural children as those opinions also claim.162 The undisputed chil-
dren of an unmarried couple are clearly the couple’s natural chil-
dren.163 Therefore, § 416(e) would apply to them if being a natural 
child were sufficient.164 The pure language of § 416(h) supports this 
reasoning.165 Section 416(h) explains how to determine whether an 
applicant is a child “for purposes of this subchapter,” and makes no ref-
erence to any limitations on the marital status of the applicant’s par-
ents.166 Thus, the Schafer court held that the statute’s plain meaning 
required the SSA to interpret the Act as it did.167 
 Finally, the Fourth Circuit relied heavily on the Act’s legislative his-
tory to determine that Congress’s intent was unambiguous.168 As the 
court accurately pointed out, reliance on intestacy statutes has always 
                                                                                                                      
155 Id. at 54–55. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 54; see supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
158 Capato I, 631 F.3d at 632. 
159 Schafer, 641 F.3d at 55; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(h)(2)(B), (h)(3)(C)(ii) (2006). For ex-
ample, § 416(h)(2)(B) allows an applicant, who “is the son or daughter” of an insured who 
fails to otherwise qualify, to receive benefits if the applicant’s parents “went through a 
marriage ceremony resulting in a purported marriage.” 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(B). 
160 Schafer, 641 F.3d at 54. 
161 Id. at 55. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
164 Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 416(e). 
165 Schafer, 641 F.3d at 55–56; see 42 U.S.C. § 416(h) (2006). 
166 Schafer, 641 F.3d at 55–56; see 42 U.S.C. § 416(h). 
167 Schafer, 641 F.3d at 56. 
168 Id. at 57–58. 
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been part of the Act, and the 1965 amendments clarify that Congress 
consistently understood that applicants must satisfy § 416(h).169 Be-
cause extramarital children were not covered by all states’ intestacy 
laws, Congress decided to add the other § 416(h) criteria as an alterna-
tive way to receive benefits.170 The Schafer court wrote that if Congress 
did not consider intestacy laws the only avenue for eligibility, it would 
not have needed to create exceptions for extramarital children to get 
around it.171 Congress could have simply clarified that “child” in 
§ 416(e) includes all biological children of a decedent.172 The Fourth 
Circuit therefore held that Congress’s unambiguous intent was for all 
applicants to satisfy § 416(h) to be eligible for benefits.173 Thus, the 
court did not need to address Chevron step two.174 
 In contrast, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, when 
considering the same question, did reach the second step of Chevron.175 
In August 2011, the Eighth Circuit decided Beeler v. Astrue, holding that 
the SSA’s interpretation of the Act was reasonable and entitled to def-
erence.176 In the opinion, however, the court improperly conducted 
the Chevron inquiry in reverse.177 Rather than determining whether or 
not Congress clearly intended a specific interpretation, the court 
jumped to the easier question of whether the SSA’s interpretation was a 
permissible reading of the statute.178 Although the court assumed ambigu-
ity and moved directly to step two, the court’s reasoning closely fol-
lowed that of the Fourth Circuit and seemed to support the same con-
                                                                                                                      
169 Id.; see Social Security Act Amendments of 1965, ch. 666, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 
286, 409–10 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)). 
170 Schafer, 641 F.3d at 57–58; see S. Rep. No. 89-404, at 109–10 (1965), reprinted in 1965 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 2049–50. 
171 Schafer, 641 F.3d at 58. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 60. 
174 See id. The court did, however, explain in dicta that even if the interpretation of the 
Act advocated by the SSA was not the only reasonable one, it fell within the range of per-
missible interpretations and would thus be entitled to Chevron deference. Id. at 60–63. 
175 See Beeler, 651 F.3d at 956. 
176 Id. The father in this case, Bruce Beeler, was an Iowa resident who died in May 
2001. Id. at 957. His wife, Patti Beeler, conceived a child in July of the following year 
through intrauterine insemination and gave birth in April 2003. Id. The SSA denied the 
child’s application for survivor benefits. Id. An ALJ and the SSA Appeals Council agreed 
that she was not a child within the meaning of the Act. Id. Mrs. Beeler then sued the 
Commissioner of Social Security, and the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
Iowa reversed the decision to deny benefits. Id.; see Beeler v. Astrue, No. C09-0019, 2009 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130944, at *1–2 (N.D. Iowa Nov. 12, 2009). 
177 See Beeler, 651 F.3d at 959–60 (beginning its analysis with a discussion of the regula-
tions’ reasonableness). 
178 See id. 
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clusion: that Congress’s unambiguous intent was for courts to interpret 
the statute as the SSA had.179 In fact, instead of explaining why the stat-
ute was ambiguous, the Eighth Circuit quoted the Fourth Circuit, stat-
ing that the text of the statute “could hardly be more clear.”180 The 
court used similarly strong language in its discussion of the Act’s legisla-
tive history.181 
asonable, it was enti-
ed 
                                                                                                                     
B. The Supreme Court’s Response: Astrue v. Capato 
 In response to the circuit split arising from these three 2011 cases, 
the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the issue of Social 
Security survivor benefits for posthumously conceived children.182 In 
the 2012 decision, Astrue v. Capato (Capato II ), the Supreme Court held 
that the SSA’s interpretation, even if not the only reasonable one, was a 
permissible construction of the Act, and therefore was entitled to def-
erence.183 Although most of the opinion advanced arguments support-
ing the conclusion that the Act must be read as the SSA reads it, imply-
ing that Congress’s intent was unambiguous, the Court did not commit 
to that holding.184 Instead, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing for a 
unanimous court, resolved the issue in the same backwards manner 
employed by the Eighth Circuit in Beeler.185 Rather than first deciding 
whether Congress’s intent was unambiguous under Chevron step one, 
the Court held that, of the two interpretations advanced by the parties, 
the SSA’s was better, and, because it was at least re
tl to deference pursuant to Chevron step two.186 
 In reaching its holding, the Capato II Court made many of the 
same points as the Fourth Circuit, pointing to flaws in the Third Cir-
cuit’s conclusion that applicants must pass through § 416(h) only if 
they are children of unmarried parents or children whose biological 
parentage is in dispute.187 The Court stated that nothing in § 416(e) 
indicates that Congress meant it to apply to children of married parents 
but not to those of unmarried parents.188 Unlike in § 416(e), Congress 
 
179 See id. at 963–64. 
180 Id. at 963 (quoting Schafer, 641 F.3d at 54) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
181 See id. at 964. 
182 Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C. (Capato II ), 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2027 (2012). 
183 Id. at 2026. 
184 See id. at 2030–33. 
185 See id. at 2033–34; supra notes 175–181 and accompanying text (discussing Beeler). 
186 See Capato II, 132 S. Ct. at 2033–34. 
187 Id. at 2029–30; Capato I, 631 F.3d at 631. 
188 Capato II, 132 S. Ct. at 2029. 
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explicitly distinguished between legitimate and extramarital children 
elsewhere in the Act as well as in contemporaneous statutes.189 The 
Court also noted that marriage does not imply that the paternity of a 
wife’s children is certain, nor does the absence of marriage indicate 
that paternity is necessarily uncertain.190 The Court went on to criticize 
the assertion that biological paternity is a prerequisite to using only 
§ 416(e) to determine whether an applicant is a “child” under the 
Act.191 In 1939, when Congress first enacted this portion of the Act, sci-
entific proof of biological paternity did not exist.192 Thus, Congress 
could not have meant to use biology to distinguish between those chil-
dren who must pass through § 416(h) and those who need only satisfy 
 41
ongress had no need to refer to § 416(h) redun-
ant
                                                                                                                     
§ 6(e).193 
 After listing its criticisms of the Third Circuit’s interpretation, the 
Capato II Court explained why the SSA’s interpretation was persua-
sive.194 Most importantly to the Court, § 416(h) explains how child sta-
tus is to be determined “for purposes of this subchapter.”195 The sub-
chapter referred to is subchapter II of the Act, which spans § 401 
through § 434.196 Because this explicit cross-reference to the entire sub-
chapter, including § 416(e), makes the connection between § 416(e) 
and § 416(h) clear, C
d ly in § 416(e).197 
 Additionally, the Court looked elsewhere in the Act to find that 
reliance on state law was “anything but anomalous.”198 “Wife,” “widow,” 
“husband,” and “widower” are all defined by reference to state law.199 In 
fact, the original version of the Act contained a single provision man-
dating the use of state law to define who qualified as a “wife,” “widow,” 
“husband,” “widower,” “parent,” and “child.”200 Using state law ensured 
 
189 Id. at 2029–30; see 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(3)(A) (2006) (referring to the “legitimate . . . 
child” of an individual); Servicemen’s Dependents Allowance Act of 1942, ch. 443, § 120, 
56 Stat. 385 (defining “child” to include “legitimate child,” “child legally adopted,” and, 
under certain conditions, “stepchild” and “illegitimate child” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 




194 Id. at 2030–33. 
195 Id. at 2030–31. 
196 Capato II, 132 S. Ct. at 2031; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 401–434 (2006). 
197 Capato II, 132 S. Ct. at 2031; see 42 U.S.C. § 416(h). 
198 Capato II, 132 S. Ct. at 2031. 
199 Id.; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(b), (c), (f), (g), (h)(1)(A). 
200 Capato II, 132 S. Ct. at 2031; see 42 U.S.C. § 409(m) (1940). 
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that the Act would cover all applicants within Congress’s contemplation 
while avoiding congressional interference with family relations, an area 
adi
ble substitute for case-
y-ca
m unfair, the Act as it currently is written compels this conclu-
sion.208 
                                                                                                                     
tr tionally within the realm of state law.201 
 Finally, the Court held that requiring applicants to satisfy § 416(h) 
was consistent with Congress’s perception of the Act’s core purpose—to 
help dependent members of a wage earner’s family when they lose the 
wage earner’s income.202 According to the Court, if a state allows a cer-
tain child to take in intestacy, it is more likely that the child will be de-
pendent during the parent’s life and at the parent’s death.203 Although 
some states provide for posthumously conceived children in their intes-
tacy statutes despite the lack of actual dependence on the parent dur-
ing the parent’s lifetime, the Court held that Congress has the right to 
generalize and use state intestacy law as a worka
b se determinations of actual dependency.204 
 Based on these observations, the Court held that the SSA’s long-
standing interpretation was reasonable and entitled to deference.205 
This assertion, along with the Fourth Circuit’s discussion in Schafer of 
the Act’s legislative history and the 1965 amendments, persuasively 
support the conclusion that the Act requires all applicants to pass 
through § 416(h) to receive child survivor benefits.206 This conclusion, 
however, eliminates benefits for posthumously conceived children 
whose biological fathers died while domiciled in states that do not in-
clude such children in their intestacy statutes.207 Although this result 
may see
 
201 Capato II, 132 S. Ct. at 2031. 
202 Id. at 2032. 
203 Id.; see Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 514–15 (1976) (“[I]n its embodiment of the 
popular view within the jurisdiction of how a parent would have his property devolve 
among his children in the event of death, without specific directions, [state intestacy law] 
also reflects to some degree the popular conception within the jurisdiction of the felt pa-
rental obligation to such . . . [a] child in other circumstances, and thus something of the 
likelihood of actual parental support during, as well as after, life.”). 
204 Capato II, 132 S. Ct. at 2032. 
205 Id. at 2033. 
206 See id.; Schafer, 641 F.3d at 57–58. 
207 Capato II, 132 S. Ct. at 2034 (“[T]he law Congress enacted calls for resolution of 
[this case] by reference to state intestacy law. We cannot replace that reference by creating 
a uniform federal rule the statute’s text scarcely supports.”). 
208 See id. 
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IV. Resolving the Issue: The Need for a Congressional Response 
to Protect the Rights of Posthumously  
Conceived Children 
 The courts that have addressed posthumously conceived children 
in the context of Social Security benefits have all tried to conclusively 
resolve the problem such children create through statutory interpreta-
tion.209 Yet, the wide spectrum of justifications courts have used to 
reach such varied conclusions highlights a large underlying problem: 
Congress did not contemplate these children when it passed the Act.210 
The Act was never meant to deal with posthumously conceived chil-
dren, and it thus must be updated in light of the advances in medical 
technologies that facilitate their birth.211 
A. Reasons Congress Must Update the Act 
 There are three fundamental reasons why updating the Act to in-
clude posthumously conceived children regardless of state intestacy law 
is both logical and necessary.212 First, the original justifications for rely-
ing on state laws are no longer relevant, and a uniform method of de-
termining which children are eligible would be more efficient and 
just.213 Second, intestacy laws in particular should not determine bene-
fits because they are inherently poor indicators of a state’s policy on 
posthumously conceived children.214 Third, explicitly adding benefits 
for posthumously conceived children would be consistent with the un-
derlying purposes and legislative history of the Act.215 
                                                                                                                      
209 See, e.g., Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C. (Capato II ), 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2030–33 (2012); 
Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954, 963–64 (8th Cir. 2011); Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49, 60 
(4th Cir. 2011); Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. (Capato I ), 631 F.3d 626, 631 
(3d Cir. 2011), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021 
(2012); Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 597 (9th Cir. 2004). 
210 See Capato II, 132 S. Ct. at 2026 (“The technology that made the twins’ conception 
and birth possible, it is safe to say, was not contemplated by Congress when the relevant 
provisions of the Social Security Act . . . originated (1939) or were amended to read as they 
now do (1965).”); Beeler, 651 F.3d at 966 (“It is unlikely that Members of Congress contem-
plated this precise question when enacting the relevant provisions of the Act in the 1930s 
and 1960s.”); Capato I, 631 F.3d at 627 (“It goes without saying that these technologies were 
not within the imagination, much less the contemplation, of Congress when the relevant 
sections of the Act came to be . . . .”). 
211 See Beeler, 651 F.3d at 966; Capato I, 631 F.3d at 627; Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 595; in-
fra notes 212–354 and accompanying text. 
212 See infra notes 216–307 and accompanying text. 
213 See infra notes 216–252 and accompanying text. 
214 See infra notes 253–273 and accompanying text. 
215 See infra notes 274–301 and accompanying text. 
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1. Congress’s Original Reasons for Deferring to the States Are No 
Longer Relevant 
 Both administrative efficiency and federalism originally led Con-
gress to defer to state laws to define the term “child.”216 Today, however, 
these justifications have lost much of their persuasive force.217 
 Deferring to the states was efficient when the Act was created, but 
changes in the structure of the Social Security system over time have 
created the need for a uniform standard.218 When the Act was written 
in 1935, Congress envisioned the states as the entities primarily respon-
sible for implementing the Act and distributing funds.219 Prior to the 
Act, about forty-five states had aid for dependent children, but in most 
of these states the programs were inoperative.220 The Act was therefore 
“designed to aid the states” in their efforts to care for dependent mem-
bers of their populations by granting money to each state to boost its 
federally approved program.221 Congress thus assumed that the states 
would continue to take the lead in caring for their own citizens by dis-
tributing federal money within the Social Security system.222 Addition-
ally, the only practical method of administering the Act at the time was 
through the states.223 The SSA’s predecessor, the Social Security Board, 
                                                                                                                      
 
216 See infra notes 218–227, 234–238 and accompanying text. 
217 See infra notes 228–233, 239–252 and accompanying text. 
218 See infra notes 219–227 and accompanying text. 
219 See Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, §§ 401–406, 49 Stat. 620, 627–29 (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601–619 (2006)) (delegating primary responsibility to the 
states to create and administer plans for aid to dependent children using federal funds); 
Carmen D. Solomon, Cong. Research Serv., 86-193 EPW, CRS Report for Congress: 
Major Decisions in the House and Senate Chambers on Social Security: 1935–1985, 
at 5 (1986); see also Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, §§ 1–4 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 301–303) (delegating primary responsibility to the states to create and adminis-
ter plans for old-age assistance using federal funds); Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, 
§§ 301–303 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 501–505) (delegating primary responsi-
bility to the states to create and administer plans for unemployment compensation using 
federal funds); Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, §§ 501–515 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 701–713) (delegating primary responsibility to the states to create and adminis-
ter plans for maternal and child welfare using federal funds). 
220 H.R. Rep. No. 615 (1935), reprinted in Bernard Schwartz, Statutory History of 
the United States: Income Security 145–56 (Robert B. Stevens ed., 1970). 
221 Id. 
222 See id.; Solomon, supra note 219, at 5. 
223 See Solomon, supra note 219, at 12; Franklin D. Roosevelt, Presidential Message 
Transmitting to the Congress a Report of the Social Security Board Recommending Cer-
tain Improvements in the Law ( Jan. 16, 1939), in Statutory History of the United 
States: Income Security, supra note 220, at 221 (noting that much of the Act’s success in 
its early years was “due to the fact that all of [its] programs . . . [we]re administered by the 
states themselves, but coordinated and partially financed by the Federal Government,” and 
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originally consisted of only three members with no facilities or budget 
and was primarily responsible for determining and reporting on the 
best methods for providing social insurance.224 Consequently, the states 
had to administer the Act because the federal government lacked the 
capacity.225 Because states assumed such a central role, it made sense to 
allow them to determine eligibility for benefits according to their own 
laws.226 Without a compelling reason to infringe on the states’ individ-
ual policies in the field of domestic relations, Congress chose to defer 
to the states to determine eligibility using standards with which they 
were already familiar.227 
 Today, however, the administration of the Act is quite different and 
Congress’s original considerations no longer apply.228 The SSA has 
grown into a large organization with plenty of resources and staff to 
handle Social Security claims at the federal level.229 Although states are 
still involved, the SSA has a large infrastructure and a uniform process 
for determining eligibility.230 As a result, a single entity, rather than fifty 
independent ones, now primarily administers the Act.231 It is thus high-
ly inefficient to force the SSA to deal with the laws of fifty different 
states to determine eligibility for benefits.232 In light of this change, uni-
formity and efficiency are compelling reasons to create a single stan-
dard for eligibility.233 
 Another reason Congress originally deferred to the states was its 
respect for principles of federalism, but this concern is now outweighed 
                                                                                                                      
that this structure “enabled [the federal government] to put these programs into opera-
tion quickly”); SSA History, SSA.gov, http://www.ssa.gov/history/orghist.html (last visited 
Feb. 9, 2013). 
224 See Solomon, supra note 219, at 12; SSA History, supra note 223. Even as regional of-
fices began to surface, many decades passed before the system was well organized and had 
uniform procedures and training for its offices. SSA History, supra note 223. 
225 See Solomon, supra note 219, at 12; SSA History, supra note 223. 
226 See Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, §§ 401–408, 49 Stat. 620, 627–29 (1935) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601–619 (2006) (delegating primary responsibility to 
the states). 
227 See id. 
228 See SSA, supra note 72, at 1. 
229 Id. In 2011, for example, the SSA reviewed 4.8 million applications for retirement, 
survivor, and Medicare benefits and decided over 795,000 hearing requests. Id. 
230 See id. (discussing the SSA’s capacity to perform various functions and process mil-
lions of applications); SSA, Pub. No. 05-10084, Survivors Benefits 7 (2012), available at 
http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/10084.pdf (explaining the uniform process for applying for 
benefits with the SSA); SSA, supra note 73, at 1–9 (explaining the uniform process for ap-
pealing a denial of benefits through the SSA). 
231 See SSA, supra note 72, at 1. 
232 See id.; SSA supra note 230, at 7; SSA, supra note 73, at 1–9. 
233 See SSA, supra note 72, at 1; SSA, supra note 230, at 7; SSA, supra note 73, at 1–9. 
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by more important considerations.234 Family relationships and intestacy 
are historically state issues, so Congress, without a reason to usurp state 
policies in that area, left them intact for purposes of the Act.235 Also, at 
the time the Act was written, states’ intestacy statutes were comprehen-
sive.236 State legislatures had thought through the policy concerns im-
plicated by allowing certain people to inherit and excluding others, tak-
ing all potential types of heirs that existed at the time into account.237 
Thus, Congress could comfortably fall back on these presumably in-
formed decisions.238 
 When posthumous conception became a reality, however, most 
states did not rush to amend their intestacy laws to account for the exis-
tence of a new type of child.239 In many cases, the exclusion of posthu-
mously conceived children from inheritance laws is not because of a 
deliberate policy decision, but instead because of inaction by legisla-
tures that are too busy with other issues or unaware of the implications 
of ignoring this problem.240 It is not fair to deny benefits to some chil-
dren merely because they are from a state that has not yet updated its 
statutes.241 Therefore, Congress should step in and create uniformity, 
rather than wait for each state to address the issue of posthumous con-
ception individually.242 
 By passing the 1965 amendments, Congress has already shown a 
willingness to ignore federalism in favor of including all children who 
                                                                                                                      
234 See Capato II, 132 S. Ct. at 2031 (stating that using state intestacy laws “avoid[ed] con-
gressional entanglement in the traditional state-law realm of family relations”); Schafer, 641 
F.3d at 62 (explaining that Congress deferred in the interest of cooperative federalism). 
235 See Capato II, 132 S. Ct. at 2031; Schafer, 641 F.3d at 62. 
236 See Nolan, supra note 11, at 1076 (noting that the state intestacy law that has been in 
place since before this technology existed is inadequate for addressing the needs of post-
humously conceived children). 
237 See Marissa J. Holob, Note, Respecting Commitment: A Proposal to Prevent Legal Barriers 
from Obstructing the Effectuation of Intestate Goals, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 1492, 1502 (2000) 
(noting that intestacy laws’ presumptions of who should take property were acceptable a 
hundred years ago before the emergence of nontraditional families). 
238 See id. 
239 See supra notes 37–44 and accompanying text (explaining that only thirteen states 
have changed their laws). 
240 See Nolan, supra note 11, at 1101–04 (exploring practical reasons for legislative de-
lay in updating intestacy statutes). 
241 See Banks, supra note 9, at 331 (noting that states’ failure to keep up with rapidly 
advancing assisted reproduction technology has “increase[d] the presence of distribu-
tional inequity where claimants of equal relational status to a worker are treated differently 
based solely upon their deceased parent’s domicile at death”). 
242 See id.; Nolan, supra note 11, at 1101–04. 
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deserve benefits.243 Although the Fourth Circuit’s analysis in Schafer v. 
Astrue of the Act’s history yields strong evidence that Congress intended 
all children to satisfy the definition of “child” in § 416(h), this history 
also exhibits why it would be appropriate for Congress to resolve the 
issue of posthumously conceived children.244 In 1965, Congress saw 
that intestacy statutes were not adequately keeping up with changing 
family structures.245 Extramarital children deserved benefits, but their 
treatment varied enormously from state to state.246 Because relying on 
inconsistent state laws to determine eligibility for this group of children 
was incompatible with the Act’s purposes, Congress added additional 
uniform standards through which an applicant could qualify.247 The 
current status of posthumously conceived children across the states is 
similar, and therefore, Congress should again take action at the federal 
level by adding additional avenues through which these children can 
qualify for benefits.248 
 Moreover, as a general matter, Congress, not the states, should de-
termine who is eligible for benefits because Social Security is a federal 
program.249 Although family relationships and intestacy are tradition-
ally state issues, state laws should not be a factor in the distribution of 
federal benefits when citizens of every state are contributing uniformly 
to the program.250 Even the Advisory Committee whose recommenda-
tions led to the 1965 amendments noted that inconsistent treatment of 
children across states is not appropriate for a federal program.251 The 
                                                                                                                      
243 See Schafer, 641 F.3d at 57–58; S. Rep. No. 89-404, at 109–10 (1965), reprinted in 1965 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 2049–50. 
244 See Schafer, 641 F.3d at 57–58. 
245 S. Rep. No. 89-404, at 109 (explaining that “[t]he States differ[ed] considerably in 
the requirements that must be met in order for a child born out of wedlock to have inheri-
tance rights”). 
246 Id. at 109–10. 
247 Id. at 110 (“[I]n a national program . . . , whether a child gets benefits should not 
depend on whether he can inherit his father’s intestate personal property under the laws 
of the state in which his father happens to live.”); see 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(B)–(3)(B) 
(2006). 
248 See S. Rep. No. 89-404, at 110; supra notes 37–44 and accompanying text (explaining 
the varied treatment of posthumously conceived children across the states). 
249 See Banks, supra note 9, at 330–31 (noting that a national program should not de-
pend on the state in which an applicant’s father happened to have lived). 
250 Id. at 267 (asserting that Congress should amend the Act to expressly address post-
humously conceived children because “[n]o local governing body or other branch of gov-
ernment should speak on behalf of Congress in matters so deeply immersed within its 
constitutionally derived authority”). 
251 Reports & Studies: 1965 Advisory Council—Part III, SSA.gov, http://www.ssa.gov/history/ 
reports/65council/65part3.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2013). 
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easiest and fairest solution is for Congress to dictate uniformly how 
posthumously conceived children should be treated for Social Security 
purposes.252 
2. Intestacy Law Is Not Appropriate for Determining a State’s Policy on 
Posthumously Conceived Children 
 A more specific problem with the current system is that intestacy 
statutes are not well suited to addressing the needs of posthumously 
conceived children.253 Usually, intestate succession clearly demonstrates 
a state’s policy on who should be considered the “child” of a deceased 
parent.254 The main purpose of an intestacy scheme is to distribute 
property according to the plan that the average person would have 
chosen himself or herself, as well as to promote society’s view of the 
family. 255 If a state believes a certain type of child, such as an extra-
marital or adopted child, deserves rights as the “child” of a decedent, 
then the state will grant them an intestate share.256 Therefore, Con-
gress’s choice to single out intestacy as the benchmark for eligibility is 
logical for other children.257 For posthumously conceived children, 
however, competing considerations make this area of law an inherently 
poor indicator of the state’s view on the child’s rights.258 The inclusion 
of posthumously conceived children in intestacy statutes is contrary to 
another central policy guiding the construction of these laws: certainty 
and finality in the distribution of estates.259 It is in the public interest to 
                                                                                                                      
 
252 See Banks, supra note 9, at 267, 330–31; Reports & Studies: 1965 Advisory Council—
Part III, supra note 251. 
253 See infra notes 254–273 and accompanying text. 
254 See Susan N. Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws to Changing Families, 18 Law & Ineq. 1, 
12–13 (2000) (discussing how intestacy statutes promote states’ conceptions of who should 
be considered a member of a decedent’s family). 
255 Holob, supra note 237, at 1500–01 (discussing major policy goals of intestacy laws). 
Other main goals include fairly distributing property among family members and promot-
ing societal interests. Id. at 1500. 
256 See Gary, supra note 254, at 12. 
257 See id. 
258 See Woodward v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 266 (Mass. 2002) (discussing 
the legislative purpose of providing “certainty to heirs and creditors by effecting the or-
derly, prompt, and accurate administration of intestate estates”); In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 
A.2d 1257, 1262 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000) (discussing the need for efficiency in estate 
distribution). 
259 In re Kolacy, 753 A.2d at 1262 (“Estates cannot be held open for years simply to al-
low for the possibility that after born children may come into existence. People alive at the 
time of a decedent’s death who are entitled to receive property from the decedent’s estate 
are entitled to receive it reasonably promptly.”); Browne C. Lewis, Dead Men Reproducing: 
Responding to the Existence of Afterdeath Children, 16 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 403, 430 (2009) 
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deal with estates quickly and efficiently by determining who is entitled 
to exactly what portion of the decedent’s property and physically dis-
tributing that property as soon as possible.260 Heirs who do not yet exist 
will affect the proportional amounts that other existing heirs will re-
ceive.261 Thus, the inclusion of posthumously conceived children in 
intestacy statutes would force existing heirs to wait until the birth of any 
such children before the size of the existing heirs’ shares can be de-
termined with finality.262 
                                                                                                                     
 As a result of these underlying considerations, state legislatures 
have valid policy reasons to construct a default estate distribution plan 
that excludes or severely limits the inclusion of posthumously conceived 
children.263 Legislatures may believe that such children have rights and 
deserve support from their deceased fathers, but nevertheless exclude 
them from intestacy laws for the sake of efficiency or practicality.264 Be-
cause these concerns do not exist with perpetually available Social Secu-
rity aid, state legislatures may decide that these children should be enti-
tled to such benefits, but may exclude them from taking intestate 
shares.265 Thus, intestacy laws should not be relied upon to determine 
the state’s view on whether posthumously conceived children should be 
considered the “children” of a decedent for the purposes of Social Secu-
rity benefits.266 
 
(noting that estates must be closed within a reasonable period of time for probate systems 
to operate efficiently). 
260 In re Kolacy, 753 A.2d at 1262; Lewis, supra note 259, at 430. 
261 Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 266 (“Any inheritance rights of posthumously conceived 
children will reduce the intestate share available to children born prior to the decedent’s 
death.”). 
262 Lewis, supra note 259, at 430 (noting that the other heirs should not have to wait 
indefinitely to receive their inheritance); Wood, supra note 10, at 903–04 (discussing the 
implications for decedent’s other children if posthumously conceived children are in-
cluded in intestate statutes). 
263 See Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 266; In re Kolacy, 753 A.2d at 1262; Lewis, supra note 
259, at 430; Wood, supra note 10, at 903–04. 
264 See Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 266; In re Kolacy, 753 A.2d at 1262; Lewis, supra note 
259, at 430; Wood, supra note 10, at 903–04. 
265 See SSA, supra note 230, at 7 (encouraging applicants to apply promptly, but provid-
ing no time limit for when an applicant must apply for benefits after the death of a wage 
earner); cf. In re Martin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d 207, 209–10 (Sur. Ct. 2007) (interpreting the term 
“issue” in a trust instrument to include posthumously conceived children, despite the fact 
that the New York legislature had excluded posthumously conceived children from intes-
tate succession, because “the concerns related to winding up a decedent’s estate differ 
from those” in a context where the disposition is not yet effective). 
266 See Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 266; In re Kolacy, 753 A.2d at 1262; Lewis, supra note 
259, at 430; Wood, supra note 10, at 903–04. 
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 Further evidence that applying intestacy statutes is inappropriate 
for determining Social Security benefits lies in state judicial deci-
sions.267 No state court has ever addressed the inheritance rights of 
posthumously conceived children in an actual intestacy proceeding.268 
Instead, state courts have almost exclusively considered the issue for the 
purpose of determining Social Security eligibility.269 The lack of case 
law reflects the infrequency with which posthumously conceived chil-
dren have sought intestate shares from a decedent’s estate.270 These 
children simply never use intestacy statutes for their intended pur-
pose.271 In Social Security cases, courts are therefore forced to apply 
the statutes to a purely theoretical situation in which a posthumously 
conceived child wants to inherit from his or her father’s estate.272 Ra-
ther than pretending that posthumously conceived children use intes-
tacy laws to inherit property, Congress should acknowledge that courts 
are only applying intestacy law to posthumously conceived children to 
determine whether the children are entitled to Social Security benefits, 
and should create an appropriate standard for that determination that 
balances the interests it implicates.273 
                                                                                                                      
267 See Finley v. Astrue, 270 S.W.3d 849, 850 (Ark. 2008); Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 260; 
Khabbaz ex rel. Eng v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 930 A.2d 1180, 1182 (N.H. 2007); In re 
Kolacy, 753 A.2d at 1259. 
268 See Wood, supra note 10, at 882–89 (surveying case law addressing the inheritance 
rights of posthumously conceived children). 
269 See, e.g., Finley, 270 S.W.3d at 850 (addressing inheritance law for a posthumously 
conceived child in a Social Security case); Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 260 (same); Khabbaz, 
930 A.2d at 1182 (same); In re Kolacy, 753 A.2d at 1259 (same); In re Martin B., 841 N.Y.S. 
2d at 209–10 (determining the inheritance rights of a posthumously conceived child un-
der a trust instrument based on whether the trustor intended the term “issue” to include 
posthumously conceived children); see also Wood, supra note 10, at 882–83 (discussing the 
lack of case law on the inheritance rights of posthumously conceived children and noting 
that the issue “finally came to light when surviving parents began petitioning for survivors 
benefits under the Social Security Act”). 
270 See Wood, supra note 10, at 882–83; see also Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
275, 290 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding that a deceased man’s frozen sperm was property, but 
declining to address the inheritance rights of a potential posthumously conceived child 
because it was so “unlikely that the estate would be subject to claims” by such a child). 
271 See Finley, 270 S.W.3d at 850; Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 260; Khabbaz, 930 A.2d at 
1182; In re Kolacy, 753 A.2d at 1259; Wood, supra note 10, at 882–89. 
272 See, e.g., Finley, 270 S.W.3d at 850; Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 260; Khabbaz, 930 A.2d at 
1182; In re Kolacy, 753 A.2d at 1259. 
273 See Finley, 270 S.W.3d at 850; Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 260; Khabbaz, 930 A.2d at 
1182; In re Kolacy, 753 A.2d at 1259; Wood, supra note 10, at 882–89. 
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3. Adding a Provision for Posthumously Conceived Children Is 
Consistent with the Act’s Purpose and History 
 Explicitly adding benefits for posthumously conceived children 
would be consistent with the underlying purpose and legislative history 
of the Act.274 The same considerations that led Congress to pass the Act 
in 1935 favor the inclusion of posthumously conceived children today.275 
 Congress passed the Act as a humanitarian endeavor to help peo-
ple in need.276 According to the 1935 House Ways and Means Commit-
tee Report endorsing the Act, its purpose was to relieve distress and to 
reduce dependency and destitution in the future.277 With these goals in 
mind, the Report stressed that “the core of any social plan must be the 
child.”278 The House committee saw that the best way to create stability 
was to give children the means to develop into competent members of 
society capable of supporting themselves.279 Therefore, because the 
goal was to create future generations of independent adults, no logical 
distinction can be made between ordinary children who need aid and 
posthumously conceived children who need aid.280 
 The reasons that led Congress to add survivor benefits in 1939 fur-
ther support the inclusion of posthumously conceived children.281 In 
1938, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Act’s creator, noted that the 
expansion of Social Security benefits was necessary because the pro-
gram “must include all who need protection.”282 Consequently, he cre-
ated the Advisory Council on Social Security to investigate deficiencies 
in the Act and recommend changes; these recommendations were sub-
                                                                                                                      
274 See Adams v. Weinberger, 521 F.2d 656, 659 (2d Cir. 1975); H.R. Rep. No. 615 (1935) 
(discussing the purposes behind the Act); Reports & Studies: 1938 Advisory Council, SSA.gov, 
http://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/38advise.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2013) (discussing the 
reasons behind the Act’s amendments). 
275 See Adams, 521 F.2d at 659; H.R. Rep. No. 615. 
276 See Adams, 521 F.2d at 659 (“The Social Security Act is remedial and its humanitarian 
aims necessitate that it be construed broadly and applied liberally.” (citations omitted)). 
277 H.R. Rep. No. 615. 
278 Id. 
279 See id. 
280 See Banks, supra note 9, at 358 (arguing that Congress’s goals of keeping families 
together and giving children the chance to grow up in health and security to create inde-
pendent adults support the notion that posthumously conceived children, like other chil-
dren who have lost a wage-earning parent, should receive benefits). 
281 See infra notes 282–287 and accompanying text. 
282 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Radio Address on the Third Anniversary of the Social Security 
Act, A Social Security Program Must Include All Those Who Need Its Protection (Aug. 15, 
1938) (emphasis added), available at http://www.socialsecurity.gov/history/fdrstmts.html. 
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sequently adopted by Congress.283 The Council determined that survi-
vor benefits for children were necessary because “many deserving cases 
[we]re not able to obtain any aid.”284 The 1939 amendments were driv-
en by a desire to comprehensively cover all children who needed and 
deserved protection by providing benefits to children who were de-
prived of support from a deceased parent.285 Because posthumously 
conceived children are deprived of their deceased fathers’ support and 
are conceived as they are due to tragic circumstances, they need and 
deserve protection as much as any parentless child.286 Extending survi-
vor benefits to them is entirely consistent with the 1939 expansion to 
cover all deserving children.287 
 The U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit have both construed the purpose of survivor benefits for 
children more narrowly: to replace the unexpected loss of a wage-
earning parent’s support.288 Therefore, as the Fourth Circuit has not-
ed, posthumously conceived children, who have never actually been 
supported by their fathers, are different from the Act’s intended bene-
ficiaries.289 But every state’s intestacy statutes provide for posthumous 
children conceived before but born after the death of their fathers.290 
By relying on state intestacy laws, Congress showed a willingness to pro-
vide survivor benefits for these children who were never actually sup-
ported by their deceased parents.291 
                                                                                                                     
 One might also argue that the purpose of survivor benefits was to 
provide support for those children who were already born or conceived 
 
283 Solomon, supra note 219, at 12–13. The Advisory Council was a group of people 
appointed to represent the public and advise the government on Social Security issues. Id. 
This Council and subsequent periodically appointed Councils were extremely influential 
in the major amendments throughout the Act’s history, especially the 1939 amendments. 
Id.; Historical Background and Development of Social Security, SSA.gov, http://www.ssa.gov/ 
history/briefhistory3.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2013). 
284 Reports & Studies: 1938 Advisory Council, supra note 274. 
285 See id.; Reports & Studies: 1938 Advisory Council Report—The Social Security Board’s Com-
ments & Recommendations, SSA.gov, http://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/38ssbadvise.html 
(last visited Feb. 9, 2013) (agreeing with the recommendations). 
286 See Banks, supra note 9, at 379 (asserting that “[t]he congressional purpose of this 
social legislation mandates that minimal accommodations be expressly provided” for post-
humously conceived children). 
287 See id.; Reports & Studies: 1938 Advisory Council, supra note 274. 
288 Capato II, 132 S. Ct. at 2032; Schafer, 641 F.3d at 58. 
289 Schafer, 641 F.3d at 58–59. 
290 Wood, supra note 10, at 897 (noting that the Uniform Probate Code and all states 
permit such posthumous children to inherit). 
291 See 42 U.S.C. § 416(h) (2006) (relying on state intestacy law to determine whether 
some applicants are “children” under the Act); Wood, supra note 10, at 897. 
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when a parent died unexpectedly, and that a living parent chooses to 
have a posthumously conceived child already knowing that the other 
parent is deceased.292 But the legislative history discussed above weighs 
against such a narrow view that focuses on the mindset of the child’s 
living parent rather than the needs of the child.293 Posthumously con-
ceived children do not choose the circumstances of their births.294 
Whether or not a mother knows before she conceives that her husband 
will die before her child is born, the situation from the child’s point of 
view is the same.295 The posthumously conceived child is, practically 
speaking, in a situation identical to that of the posthumous child: fa-
therless and incapable of receiving support from that father in his life-
time.296 The only difference is the timing of conception.297 In fact, the 
Fourth Circuit in Schafer even acknowledged that some posthumously 
conceived children are “similarly situated enough to more traditionally 
conceived children” that they deserve to inherit from their fathers.298 
The purposes given for protecting children under the Act—to reduce 
future dependency and create security—favor inclusion of both types of 
children.299 Posthumously conceived children deserve the same chance 
to become productive members of society as traditional posthumous 
children, and if supporting one group is good for future economic sta-
bility, then supporting the other is too.300 Given the Act’s underlying 
purposes, the law should not draw a line between these two groups.301 
                                                                                                                      
292 See Capato II, 132 S. Ct. at 2032; Schafer, 641 F.3d at 58. 
293 See Adams, 521 F.2d at 659; H.R. Rep. No. 615 (1935); Banks, supra note 9, at 358, 
379. 
294 See Nolan, supra note 11, at 1105 (“Imposing disabilities on a posthumously con-
ceived child who is not responsible for his or her own birth is both ineffectual and unjust.” 
(citation omitted)); supra notes 276–287 and accompanying text. 
295 See Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 266 (“Posthumously conceived children may not come 
into the world the way the majority of children do. But they are children nonetheless.”); 
Nolan, supra note 11, at 1067–68 (noting that posthumously conceived children are just 
posthumous children born within an extended time interval). 
296 See Nolan, supra note 11, at 1067–68. 
297 See id. 
298 Schafer, 641 F.3d at 59. 
299 See Adams, 521 F.2d at 659; H.R. Rep. No. 615 (1935); Banks, supra note 9, at 358, 
379. 
300 See Banks, supra note 9, at 302 (arguing that both groups deserve support from a 
predeceased parent, and that society should not punish posthumously conceived children 
because of how their parents chose to procreate). 
301 See H.R. Rep. No. 615; Banks, supra note 9, at 376–77 (arguing that including post-
humously conceived children furthers Congress’s interest in preventing future state wards, 
and that it may be better to help them with Social Security funds, to which the child’s 
working parent contributed, than the general treasury); Nolan, supra note 11, at 1067–68. 
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4. Congress Must Update the Act 
 It is unfair to deny benefits to a class of children based on provi-
sions of the Act that were written when posthumous conception was 
mere science fiction.302 When a child has no father—for the sole rea-
son that cancer took his life before he could start a family with his 
wife—it is difficult to say that the child does not deserve the same pro-
tection given to a child conceived immediately before his father’s 
death.303 It is even more difficult to say that such a child should not re-
ceive benefits because his father died a resident of Virginia, when the 
same child would receive benefits had his father lived in Massachu-
setts.304 Courts should not be asked to deny benefits to posthumously 
conceived children when Congress did not consider whether to include 
them or not.305 The standards currently governing eligibility unfairly 
exclude many posthumously conceived children from benefits for rea-
sons that can no longer be justified.306 Therefore, the best solution is 
for Congress to amend the Act to explicitly provide benefits to posthu-
mously conceived children.307 
                                                                                                                     
B. A Proposed Solution 
 Congress should insert a section into the Act that explicitly grants 
benefits to posthumously conceived children.308 It would be unfair, 
however, to allow all such children to qualify automatically.309 To bal-
ance the rights of the deceased father, the grieving mother, and the fa-
therless child, Congress must place restraints on the timing of concep-
tion and require the written consent of the deceased biological father.310 
 
 
302 See Capato I, 631 F.3d at 627. 
303 See Nolan, supra note 11, at 1067–68. 
304 See Banks, supra note 9, at 331. 
305 See Capato II, 132 S. Ct. at 2034 (stating that, despite the tragic circumstances giving 
rise to the case, the Court had to interpret the law Congress enacted and could not 
“creat[e] a uniform federal rule the statute’s text scarcely supports”); Woodward, 760 
N.E.2d at 272 (noting that issues surrounding posthumously conceived children should be 
addressed by the legislature); Nolan, supra note 11, at 1088 (noting that legislatures can 
weigh policies whereas judiciaries can only decide the cases before them). 
306 See supra notes 216–301 and accompanying text. 
307 See Banks, supra note 9, at 259. 
308 See supra notes 216–301 and accompanying text. 
309 See Wood, supra note 10, at 902–03 (discussing other interests involved in allowing 
posthumously conceived children to inherit). 
310 See Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 265, 269 (discussing the need to protect the best inter-
ests of children and the reproductive freedom of the father in limiting inheritance rights 
through timing and consent requirements); Wood, supra note 10, at 902–03 (discussing 
the need to protect the mother and father’s interests in limiting posthumously conceived 
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Scholars have suggested such limitations with respect to amending state 
intestacy laws to cover posthumous conception, but these limits apply 
just as well in the context of a uniform federal standard.311 
                                                                                                                     
 First, Congress should limit eligibility for benefits based on how 
much time has passed between the wage earner’s death and the child’s 
conception.312 The mother cannot be pressured into having a child too 
soon, while she is still mourning the death of her husband.313 Conceiv-
ing through artificial reproduction can also be difficult, and women 
may need some time to become pregnant.314 After too much time has 
passed, however, the decision to have a child seems more like a unilat-
eral choice by the mother to become a single parent.315 She looks no 
different from a woman who uses a sperm donor to become pregnant 
on her own.316 Therefore, she should not get extra support from the 
government simply because she happens to have the sperm of her de-
ceased husband.317 The contention that a child is losing the support of 
a parent that would otherwise have been there becomes less under-
standable as the gap in time between the father’s death and the child’s 
conception increases.318 
 This tension may help explain the radically different outcomes in 
the cases discussed above.319 The statute as it currently is written can 
only be read in one of two extreme ways: (1) either all children con-
 
children’s inheritance rights); Nelson, supra note 47, at 775 (arguing that, after the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s 2004 decision in Gillett-Netting v. Barnhardt, states 
should establish a time limit for when children are considered heirs for purposes of intes-
tacy statutes). 
311 See Wood, supra note 10, at 902–03; Nelson, supra note 47, at 775. 
312 See Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 266–68; Wood, supra note 10, at 905–06; Nelson, supra 
note 47, at 775. 
313 See Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 268; Wood, supra note 10, at 905–06; Nelson, supra note 
47, at 775. 
314 See Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 268; Nelson, supra note 47, at 775. 
315 See Knaplund, supra note 49, at 627–28 (noting that a woman has a choice to be-
come a single parent using the sperm of a random donor, of a man she knows, or of her 
deceased husband). 
316 See id. 
317 See id. at 656–67 (arguing that women have financial incentives to choose deceased 
husbands’ sperm to reproduce). 
318 See id. 
319 See Capato II, 132 S. Ct. at 2026 (holding that the SSA’s interpretation was reason-
able); Beeler, 651 F.3d at 966 (holding that the SSA’s interpretation was reasonable); Schafer, 
641 F.3d at 60 (holding that Congress’s unambiguously expressed intent was to require 
satisfaction of § 416(h)); Capato I, 631 F.3d at 631 (holding that Congress’s unambiguously 
expressed intent was for satisfaction of § 416(e) to be sufficient); Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 
597 (holding that Congress’s unambiguously expressed intent was for satisfaction of 
§ 416(e) to be sufficient). 
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ceived after their fathers’ deaths are entitled to benefits, or (2) no chil-
dren conceived after their fathers’ deaths are entitled to benefits unless 
state intestacy law provides for them.320 The Third and Ninth Circuits 
dealt with children conceived shortly after their fathers’ deaths.321 
Faced with the type of child who deserved protection, these courts were 
uncomfortable denying benefits to the entire class of posthumously 
conceived children.322 Alternatively, the Fourth Circuit heard a case in 
which the child was born seven years after his father had died.323 The 
court likely concluded that such a child should not be entitled to bene-
fits simply because the sperm came from the mother’s long-dead hus-
band rather than an anonymous donor.324 Therefore, the court chose 
the interpretation excluding the entire class of children who could not 
inherit under state law.325 Even the Eighth Circuit and U.S. Supreme 
Court cases, which applied backward Chevron inquiries, may be attribut-
able to the fact that the children in question were born so closely to 
their fathers’ deaths.326 These courts, facing the persuasive logic of the 
Fourth Circuit and plaintiffs who seemed to deserve protection, per-
haps wanted to soften the harshness of the Fourth Circuit’s conclu-
sion.327 Thus, instead of foreclosing the possibility of benefits based on 
the statute itself, the courts did not determine whether this was Con-
gress’s unambiguously expressed intent, but simply that the SSA’s con-
struction was permissible.328 The SSA can easily change its policy with-
out congressional action.329 
                                                                                                                      
320 See Schafer, 641 F.3d at 60 (interpreting the Act as denying benefits to all posthu-
mously conceived children who cannot inherit under state law); Capato I, 631 F.3d at 631 
(interpreting the Act as granting benefits to all posthumously conceived children). 
321 See Capato I, 631 F.3d at 627–28 (addressing a child conceived within nine months 
of the father’s death); Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 594–95 (addressing a child conceived with-
in ten months of the father’s death). 
322 See Capato I, 631 F.3d at 631; Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 597. 
323 See Schafer, 641 F.3d at 51. 
324 See id. at 59 (expressing concern that “survivorship benefits would serve a purpose 
more akin to subsidizing the continuance of reproductive plans than to insuring against 
unexpected losses”). 
325 Id. at 60. 
326 See Capato II, 132 S. Ct. at 2026; Beeler, 651 F.3d at 957. In Capato II, the Supreme 
Court specifically criticized the lack of any time limitation in the Third Circuit’s interpreta-
tion of the Act, noting that the states that provide for posthumously conceived children in 
their intestacy statutes generally include time limits and that the Act itself has duration-of-
relationship limitations in several other sections. Capato II, 132 S. Ct. at 2031–32. 
327 See Capato II, 132 S. Ct. at 2026; Beeler, 651 F.3d at 966. 
328 See Capato II, 132 S. Ct. at 2026; Beeler, 651 F.3d at 966. 
329 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 901–902 (2006) (creating the SSA and delegating rulemaking au-
thority to promulgate and interpret the Act). 
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 As courts can only interpret the Act as written, Congress must de-
cide what the appropriate time limit on conception should be.330 
Adopting a bright-line rule for when conception must occur requires a 
judgment of when a woman has had enough time to grieve and to con-
ceive, issues that vary immensely from person to person based on phys-
ical, social, cultural, and other factors.331 Although ideally each case 
would be evaluated based on each woman’s specific situation, the SSA 
deals with so many claims each year that a bright-line rule is the only 
practical way to handle this issue.332 Congress is also in a better position 
than the SSA to weigh the concerns involved and make a broad policy 
decision, rather than leaving each case to the discretion of the SSA’s 
staff.333 
 The chosen time limit must be at least a few years, to allow for 
grieving and potential issues with conception, but somewhere less than 
the seven years confronting the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit in the 2011 case, Schafer v. Astrue.334 When suggesting appropri-
ate time limits with regard to state intestacy statutes, scholars have con-
sidered other factors, such as the finality of estate distribution and pro-
tection of the rights of other surviving heirs.335 Thus, scholars have 
endorsed limits of two or three years by which time the child must be in 
utero.336 Because Social Security is not affected by these administrative 
concerns, however, a federal standard can be more accommodating to 
the different obstacles a woman may face before she can conceive.337 
                                                                                                                      
330 See Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 272 (noting that courts “can only address the specific 
circumstances of each controversy that presents itself,” whereas questions on posthumously 
conceived children “cry out for lengthy, careful examination” by the legislature); Nolan, 
supra note 11, at 1089 (“The judiciary’s major function is to interpret and construe statutes 
. . . not to make new policy.”). 
331 See Wood, supra note 10, at 906 (discussing potential time limits that respect the 
woman’s need to grieve before deciding to conceive). 
332 See SSA, supra note 72, at 1 (indicating that the SSA reviewed 4.8 million applica-
tions in 2011). 
333 See Nolan, supra note 11, at 1089–90 (arguing that the legislature is the most ap-
propriate body to make public policy decisions). 
334 See Schafer, 641 F.3d at 51; Wood, supra note 10, at 903–04. 
335 See Wood, supra note 10, at 903–04; Nelson, supra note 47, at 775. 
336 See Knaplund, supra note 49, at 652–53 (agreeing with California’s limit of two years 
and Louisiana’s limit of three years from the decedent’s death in the context of filing pa-
ternity actions); Wood, supra note 10, at 906 (suggesting a time limit two or three years 
after the decedent’s death). 
337 Cf. In re Martin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d at 209–10 (noting that administrative concerns, like 
certainty and finality of estate distribution, that may leave posthumously conceived chil-
dren out of intestacy statutes, do not affect trust instruments that have not yet been ef-
fected). 
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Therefore, four years may be more appropriate for Social Security ben-
efits, as it seems to strike a better balance between the relevant con-
cerns for the majority of cases.338 Four years gives most women enough 
time to grieve a husband’s death, to deal with any other crises like the 
unexpected loss of a job or sudden illness, and to conceive success-
fully.339 At the same time, it does not reach unreasonably far past the 
death of the father, so it limits abuse of the system by would-be single 
mothers choosing their husbands’ sperm over a stranger’s solely for the 
financial benefit.340 
 In addition to timing, the second limitation on posthumously con-
ceived children’s eligibility must be written consent from the father to 
have and support children conceived by the mother with his sperm.341 
Complex biological relationships can arise in the modern world of as-
sisted reproduction, and mere biological paternity does not necessarily 
indicate that a man plans to have a parent-child relationship with and 
financially support the resulting child.342 Survivor benefits function as a 
replacement for the lost financial support of a deceased parent.343 This 
backdrop assumes that were the father alive, he would have chosen to 
have and support children.344 Therefore, a consent requirement is es-
sential.345 
 Demanding consent protects the father’s right to be financially 
responsible only for children he agreed to have and support.346 The 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in the 2002 case, Woodward v. 
Commissioner of Social Security, stressed that fathers, despite being de-
ceased, should have a right to control if and by whom their sperm is 
used.347 The court held that affirmative consent was essential to pro-
                                                                                                                      
338 See Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 268; Knaplund, supra note 49, at 656–67; Wood, supra 
note 10, at 905–06; Nelson, supra note 47, at 775. 
339 See Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 268; Wood, supra note 10, at 905–06; Nelson, supra note 
47, at 775. 
340 See Knaplund, supra note 49, at 656–67. 
341 See Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 269 (acknowledging the need for “affirmative consent”). 
342 Capato I, 631 F.3d at 632 (discussing the complexities that arise from the possibility 
of assisted reproduction); Hill, supra note 150, at 355 (explaining the various potential 
family structures that can arise through assisted reproduction); Wood, supra note 10, at 
903 (noting that men who preserve sperm during life may not contemplate the possibility 
that their wives will conceive after their deaths). 
343 Knaplund, supra note 49, at 631. 
344 See Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 269. 
345 See id. 
346 Id.; Lewis, supra note 259, at 441 (contending that a writing requirement protects a 
deceased father’s rights by not making him responsible for children he did not agree to 
conceive). 
347 Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 269. 




rather than that of a random donor—for the financial benefit.354 
ived children to receive Social Secu-
rity benefits in a uniform manner. 
Alycia Kennedy 
                                                                                                                     
tecting that right.348 Additionally, the father’s consent is relevant with 
respect to Social Security benefits when the father already has other 
existing children.349 The benefits paid on behalf of any deceased per-
son are limited to between 150% and 180% of the deceased’s benefit 
account.350 Although the addition of one child might not bring the 
family past that limit, it can if there are enough other beneficiaries.351 
Therefore, consent protects the father’s right to support only the chil-
dren for whom he planned to be responsible and protects his other 
children’s rights to receive the full benefits to which they 
tl 352 
 In addition, consent functions as a second check to insulate the sys-
tem from abuse.353 By only giving benefits to children whose fathers pro-
vided consent, the requirement further limits single mothers from uni-
laterally choosing to conceive using their long-dead husbands’ sp
Conclusion 
 The Social Security Act is not well equipped to deal with the needs 
of posthumously conceived children. As a result, legislative inaction has 
left an entire class of children, already born into tragic situations, with-
out the support they deserve. Reproductive technology has drastically 
changed the modern world and the law has not adjusted accordingly. 
The fairest and most efficient solution is for Congress to amend the Act 
to provide for posthumously conce
 
348 Id. 
349 See SSA, supra note 72, at 8–9 (discussing the amount of benefits for each survivor 
and maximum benefits for each family). 
350 Id. at 9. 
351 See id. at 8–9. 
352 Wood, supra note 10, at 904 (arguing that consent “protect[s] the deceased parent’s 
interest in knowing and voluntary support”). 
353 See Knaplund, supra note 49, at 656–67; Wood, supra note 10, at 903–04 (arguing 
that consent acts as a check on a spouse’s unilateral decision to conceive). 
354 See Knaplund, supra note 49, at 656–67; Wood, supra note 10, at 903 (noting that by 
solely requiring biological paternity, the estate is “at the mercy of the unilateral choices of 
[the father’s] surviving partner”). 
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